if (1) then i certainly agree that none of this really matters (i apologise if that wasn't clear from my previous comment).
on the other hand, if his objective is (2), and not everyone is using some of this obfuscation, then this separates you from the crowd for a little while (but my model is that as time goes on, you are inevitably exploited).
i realise after your company was exploited it might make you feel like (1) is always the case but for many (2) is the salient threat.
Generally speaking, the people running around with OpenVPN and SSH zero day are looking to break into your machine. The people looking to break into any machine are either targeting Windows clientsides, or weeks-to-months-old web vulnerabilities.
People with SSH zero-day are not, by and large, looking to burn those vulnerabilities by spraying them into every busybody's honey pot logs.
> The people looking to break into any machine are either targeting Windows clientsides, or weeks-to-months-old web vulnerabilities.
Actually the people looking to break into your machine are targeting windows clientsides and weeks-to-months-old web vulnerabilities.
There's a cost involved in developing 0day, droppers, remote access trojans, maintaining breach and exfil teams etc. If these guys can get into the developer laptops with an email, a wink and a PDF then why waste the 0day? If you're putting all your effort into a custom SSH daemon without expending equivalent effort on your connection sources (especially when connecting to the Internet) then you're doing it wrong.
1. break into your machine?
2. break into some machine?
if (1) then i certainly agree that none of this really matters (i apologise if that wasn't clear from my previous comment).
on the other hand, if his objective is (2), and not everyone is using some of this obfuscation, then this separates you from the crowd for a little while (but my model is that as time goes on, you are inevitably exploited).
i realise after your company was exploited it might make you feel like (1) is always the case but for many (2) is the salient threat.